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Abstract
In this study, an assessment of the degree of worker mobility in the Portuguese Labor Market is
performed by building on the dynamic monopsony literature. By producing rm-level estimates of
the elasticity of the labor supply facing the rm, it is possible to conclude that workers have little
sensitivity to real wage changes and, thus, that rms enjoy considerable wage-setting power. However,
the extend to which one can relate such low worker mobility to monopsony power is severely questioned
by rst estimating the impact of the estimated measures of the labor supply elasticity on wages and
by then assessing how such estimates correlate with three high-dimensional xed eects - worker, rm
and job title - taken from the standard Mincer equation.
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1 Introduction
What happens if an employer cuts the wage it pays its workers by one cent?
(Allan Manning, Monopsony in Motion, 2003)
If perfectly free competition prevailed everywhere, the wage rate paid by any employer in any occupation would be
determinate at a denite point. The value of the marginal net product of labor of given quality would be the same to
all employers [...] and, if one employer oered a man less than others, that man would know that he could at once
get as much as this value of his marginal net product from others. In so far, however, as movements of workpeople
are hampered by ignorance and costs, a monopolistic element is introduced into the wage bargain.
(Arthur Pigou, The Economics of Welfare, 1932)
In a perfectly competitive labor market, each worker has full information about the number of jobs
available and the wage they pay, is capable of processing such information instantly and faces no costs of
switching jobs, leaving competing employers no choice but to oer the individual his/her (known) marginal
revenue product. Additionally, rms face no costs from worker turnover. In such a labor market, wage
dispersion comes as a consequence of worker and rm heterogeneity, inasmuch as these lead to a set of
possible productivity realizations and, additionally, as workers dier in their preferences for non-monetary
aspects of their potential employers and as rms dier in the oered combinations of such aspects with
the wage they pay. The labor supply facing the rm is perfectly elastic.
By contrast, in an imperfectly competitive labor market wages vary according to many other factors,
such as the reservation wages of workers, job oer arrival rates (assumed to be innite in the competitive
model), job destruction rates or the size of the labor market, to name a few. In such a market, there are
bad and good jobs and the reasons for this lie beyond productive factors. Considerations regarding the
structure of the labor market, such as the number of rms contesting a pool of workers and the degree of
inter-rm mobility of such workers, arise as crucial variables of interest in wage determination.
Monopsony was rst dened and analytically treated by Joan Robinson (1933), who coined the term so
as to replace the formerly used monopoly-buyer (Karatzas, 2009). While the actual word literally stands
for single buyer, the concept of monopsony power should be treated the same way monopoly power is
unanimously regarded by economists: as the existence of power over price through control of quantity
(Boal and Ransom, 2002), with the dierence that such power comes from the demand rather than from
the supply side of the market. Therefore, there is demand market power in the labor market whenever
employers have some discretion over the wage they pay or, put in another way, whenever the supply of
labor facing the rm is upward-sloping.
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This labor supply curve is not to be confounded with the market labor supply curve, as the latter
reects workers' decision on whether or not to participate in the labor market while the former translates
their decision, once participating in the labor market, to accept a given job oer or to keep searching
while either employed or non-employed.1 The positive slope of the market labor supply curve arises from
heterogeneity in reservation wages - the higher the market wage, the more hours of leisure workers will be
willing to sell or the more workers will want to participate in the labor market -, while the positive slope
of the labor supply facing the rm arises because a rm paying a higher wage is more likely to attract
workers from other rms. The second concept is, hence, the right one to assess the degree of demand-side
competition in the labor market.2
Since Robinson, monopsony has been regarded as a mere theoretical issue, with weak adherence to real-
life labor markets.3 However, many explanations of labor market phenomena implicitly assume some kind
of wage-setting power by employers, with the special example of search theory; in fact, it was only when
economists were able to analytically generate equilibrium wage dispersion that labor market monopsony
eectively entered the research agenda. In their seminal paper, Burdett and Mortensen (1998) formulated
a non-degenerate equilibrium wage distribution in a wage-posting search model in which workers receive
a nite number of job oers per period, i.e., in a model with labor market frictions. This paper, which is
considered to be the cornerstone of the new monopsony literature, inspired Manning (2003) to take the
model further, using it to provide explanations to many empirical ndings in a much more plausible way
than those oered by the competitive model. For instance, the gender pay gap can be explained in terms of
dierences in the elasticity of the labor supply to the rm, with female workers having a less elastic supply
due to the fact that they value non-monetary aspects of the job (such as commuting time or number of
hours oered) more; in this case, rms will engage in third-degree price discrimination by paying a lower
wage to the type of labor with the less elastic supply. Another example regards the returns to experience:
in a market where workers have less than perfect mobility, rms will supply general training (as it actually
happens) and gains from experience reect the fact that workers have had more time to work themselves
up the job ladder.4 Yet another theoretical ramication of the assumption that employers post wages,
1The clearest example comes from the perfect competition model: a positively-slopped market labor supply coexists with
an innitely elastic labor supply curve facing each rm.
2Analogously, it is the rm-level demand elasticity Industrial Organization looks at when addressing the existence of
monopoly power.
3The little interest labor economists have felt for monopsony is powerfully illustrated by Manning (2003): The rst two
volumes of the Handbook of Labor Economics (Ashenfelter and Layard, 1986) contain only two references to monopsony out
of a total of 1268 pages [. . . ]. The three subsequent volumes published in 1999 (Ashenfelter and Card, 1999) contain three
references in 2362 pages. Manning himself took matters into his own hands, writing the chapter on Imperfect Competition
in Labor Markets in the 4th volume of the Handbook.
4Returns to tenure, in turn, are explained by stating that more senior workers are those who have already few better
options left from which to choose.
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while not belonging to the class of monopsonistic models, is eciency wage theory, which states that rms
pay above market-clearing levels so as to avoid shirking by workers or to reduce turnover.
At this stage, a word of notice should be stated: monopsony is not the only theoretical framework
where labor market frictions can be found. The statement that the relationship between the employee
and the employer creates rents (i.e., that the wage paid is seldom equal to a worker's marginal revenue
product) has very predictably generated two general views on the issue, of which monopsony, that focused
on the appropriation of such rents by the employer, is one. The other side of the issue views rents being
split between the worker and the employer according to the bargaining power of workers, and is based on
ex post wage-bargaining models like those exposed in Mortensen and Pissarides (1999). A very competent
overview of both sides of the literature on labor market imperfections can be found in Manning (2011).
This study is the second one to produce rm-level estimates of the wage elasticity of the labor supply
curve facing the rm (being the rst one that of Webber, 2013a), by building on the dynamic monopsony
literature introduced in Section 2. Section 3 exposes the theoretical framework sustaining the empirical
specication of Section 5, with the dataset being described in Section 4. The results, which will reveal the
degree of worker mobility in the Portuguese labor market, will then be fed into a wage equation to assess
the impact of such market power upon wages, as well as to study whether there is any relation between
them and standard xed eects. This second analysis of Section 6, as well as the empirical approach to
the estimation of the labor supply elasticities, are to our knowledge a novelty in the literature. Section 7
concludes.
2 The dynamic monopsony literature
Since the release of Burdett and Mortensen (1998) and especially after Manning (2003) suggested a
way of estimating the average elasticity of the labor supply curve facing the rm (in a steady-state) based
on the wage elasticity of separations, there has been some (though not abundant) empirical interest in
putting a number to this quantity. This subset of the monopsony literature, which is denoted as that of
dynamic monopsony models, has evolved considerably ever since. Ransom and Sims (2010) and Ransom
and Oaxaca (2010) have arguably been the rst studies following these lines, although they have not
gone any further besides stating the elasticity of labor supply as negative two times the elasticity of
separations. Some months after, Booth and Katic (2010) acknowledge that transitions to and from non-
employment are also sensitive to wages, and estimate separation equations independently for transitions
to/from employment and to/from unemployment.
In the same year, Hirsch et al. (2010) becomes the rst study to fully implement Manning's recom-
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mendations, recognizing that a rm's separation to non-employment is not another rm's recruit from
non-employment. In the meanwhile, Falch (2011, 2013) estimates the average wage elasticities of sepa-
rations and recruits, respectively, based on a mandated rise in the wages of some demand-constrained
schools in Norway. Two large steps further were then taken: rst, Depew and Sorensen (2011) manage to
estimate the average elasticity of the labor supply to the rm in the short-run; later, Webber (2013a,b) is
able to produce rm-specic, short-run estimates, estimating the distribution of monopsony power across
American rms. Finally, Hirsch et al. (2013) improves upon Webber's (2013a,b) theoretical model to
estimate the cyclicity of labor market power, being arguably the state-of-the-art in dynamic monopsony
models. These three papers provide the main inspiration to this study.
3 Theoretical Framework
The empirical strategy which will lead us to rm-specic estimates of the elasticity of the labor supply
is anchored to theoretical considerations consisting of a partial equilibrium application of the dynamic
monopsony model of Burdett and Mortensen (1998), rst presented in Manning (2003) and which have
been developed as the dynamic monopsony literature evolved.
We start by assuming that the labor supply faced by the rm is given by the following dynamic identity
for employment:5
Nt = Nt−1[1− s(wt)] +R(wt) = Nt−1[1− se(wt)− sn(wt)] +Re(wt) +Rn(wt) , (1)
where Nt is employment at the rm at period t, s(wt) is the rm's separation rate from period t − 1 to
period t and R(wt) is the ow of recruits from period t − 1 to period t. For reasons which will become
clear below, we decompose worker ows into ows to/from employment (superscript e) and ows to/from
non-employment (superscript n). Letting γt = [(Nt − Nt−1)/Nt−1] be the periodic employment growth




γt + se(wt) + sn(wt)
. (2)
Now, one takes the natural logarithm on both sides, dierentiates and multiplies by the periodic wage to
5After which the term dynamic monopsony was named. It simply states that employment in one period equals last
period's employment times the percentage of workers who do not separate (those who stayed with the rm) plus recruits
(those who joined the rm).
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[1− θs(wt)]γt + sn(wt)
εnsw , (3)
where θR(wt) is the share of recruits from employment and θs(wt) is the share of separations to employment.
At this stage, one has that estimating the elasticity of the labor supply to the rm requires estimation of
four worker ow elasticities. While the elasticity of separations can be estimated from a standard matched
employer-employee data set like the one used here, to estimate the elasticity of recruitment would require
information on the number of applications each rm receives for any given job and at any going wage,
which is not available in our data set (nor in any other in the dynamic monopsony literature).
To circumvent this issue, we resort to the Burdett and Mortensen (1998) model so as to relate re-
cruitment from employment to separations to employment. In this model, employed and non-employed
workers are oered jobs at a constant rate λ, with wages being drawn from the wage-oer distribution
F (w) - the actual wage oer distribution observed in reality, which is the equilibrium variable of the model.
Because employed workers are assumed to switch jobs whenever they receive a higher-paying oer, job
ows to/from employment when the rm is paying a wage wt are given by





By (4), the elasticity of separations to employment is given by [−λwtf(wt)/se(wt)]. Using this expression,









To address recruitment from non-employment, Manning (2003) stated that by using the expression
for θR(wt) and applying the transformations required to arrive to recruitment elasticities (taking logs,













where εRθw stands for the wage elasticity of the share of recruits from employment. Finally, combining (3),
(6) and (7) yields the expression which enables estimation of the elasticity of the labor supply facing the
rm:
εNw = −





sn(wt) + [1− θs(wt)]γt
εnsw − εRθw (8)
In summary, to estimate εNw it is necessary to model the elasticity of separations to employment
(εesw), the elasticity of separations to non-employment (ε
n
sw)
6 and the elasticity of the share of recruits
from employment (εRθw) and to combine them with some computed measures. Equation (8) is dierent
from the one used in Webber (2013a,b) but equal to that of Hirsch et al. (2013), as the former implicitly
assumes, upon imposing the theoretical conditions (4) and (5), that R(wt)/R
e(wt) = 1. One note worth
mentioning is that it is not enough to set γt = 0 to obtain long-run estimates of εNw, as stated in Webber
(2013a) or Hirsch et al. (2013); the three elasticity estimates should come from a model setting one period
as the long-run, thereby raising the problems of dening such time horizon and of reduced sample size
(through the collapse of the time dimension); we therefore do not compute such measure and restrain
ourselves to short-run estimates. The next section now looks at the empirical procedure to estimate the
three quantities.
4 Data
In this study, we resort to Quadros de Pessoal (Portuguese for Personnel Records), an annual admin-
istrative linked employer-employee data set started in 1985 (with interruptions in 1990 and 2001). It is
a compulsory employment survey covering all establishments with wage earners (aside from independent
workers and civil servants) and features, among other data on workers and their employers, detailed infor-
mation on earnings, namely the base wage but also regular and irregular benets, overtime pay and the
corresponding wage bargaining mechanism. For further information on the data set, please see Cardoso et
al. (2012).
The sample for the estimation of rm-level labor supply elasticities spans from 1986 to 2012 and
contains all workers aging from 18 to 64 years old, with a wage of at least 80% of the minimum wage
and with a single social security code (the worker identier). Only workers with at least 120 weekly hours
worked are included and multiple job holders are excluded. The measure of wage used is real hourly wage,
with wages deated to 1986 currency units according to CPI.7
6It should be noted that estimating the elasticity of separations to non-employment has as an implicit assumption that
there is a stochastic component to workers' reservation wage, in contrast with the simplest equilibrium search models such
as Burdett and Mortensen (1998).
7By comparison with the previous literature, which uses mainly quarterly earnings, one should note that the time scaling
of the wage variable is not relevant per se, in that one is measuring coecients on the percent change of such variable, but
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In a slightly more tolerant fashion than that of Webber (2013a), performance of rm-specic estimation
is done on a sample comprised of rms with no less than 20 separations to employment, 20 separations to
non-employment, 20 recruits from employment and 20 recruits from non-employment over the sample pe-
riod. This resulted in a sample of 7,331 rms, of which 664 were dropped during estimation of the required
elasticities due to lack of convergence in a given model; the remaining rms account for 11,143,220 job
spell-year observations and 2,673,869 independent workers, accompanied over the 26-year period. For the
estimation of the full-economy models,8 the last restriction is not necessary and we thus use a sample with
43,209,364 observations (7,061,432 workers). For the estimation of wage equations with high-dimensional
xed eects and for the analysis of the sources of monopsony power, we will resort to the restricted dataset
so as to use our rm-level estimates. Finally, specication tests on the models for estimating the three
components of (8) were conducted on a sub-sample due to the very demanding computational requirements
of estimating three models per each of the 7,331 rms in many dierent ways; the Aveiro region was thus
chosen due to its medium size (988,158 observations, representing 192,764 workers and 494 rms), which
makes the exercise feasible and, at the same time, econometrically representative.
Quadros de Pessoal is often regarded as presenting high-quality data, as it is meant for public use
and as it is consequently put through regular quality checks by the Ministry of Employment, the public
entity responsible for the database. However, there is one variable which is crucial to the estimation of the
wage elasticity of labor supply facing the rm and which is measured with error: the indicator variable for
whether the worker is a recruit or not. This happens because some workers' rst registry under a job spell
states a tenure of more than 12 months, which does not qualify such observations as recruits. This has an
indirect impact in the estimation of the labor supply elasticities, as the number of recruits at each period
is underestimated, which by turn causes net job creation to be underestimated as well. The employment
growth rate is hence replaced by the growth rate of a variable reported in Quadros de Pessoal, which is
the number of people serving the rm (employees and managers) and which correlates very strongly with
the computed rm size. There is also a direct eect in estimating εRθw, though one should note that this
does not go beyond diminishing the number of observations for the model which will estimate the wage
elasticity of the share of recruits from employment, and should therefore not imply any inconsistency from
the empirical estimates.
rather to control for the number of hours worker.
8Which are meant to yield the average value of the labor supply elasticity facing the rm.
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5 Firm-level labor supply elasticity
Estimation
Section 3 led to the conclusion that three quantities must be estimated for us to measure εNw. In
what regards the rst two, by modeling the instantaneous separation rates to employment and to non-
employment as, respectively, sE(x) = exp(βEx) and sN (x) = exp(βNx), and by assuming that they are,
conditional on the vector of covariates x, independent, Manning (2003) has shown that the two may be
estimated disjointedly by two univariate models.9 Bearing this in mind, and following the most recent
dynamic monopsony literature, one assumes that the duration of a given job spell (the dependent variable
in both models) follows a Proportional Hazards model with exponential scale factor, i.e.,
λh(t, x) = λh0 (t) exp[β
hln(earningsi(t)) + ϕ
hXi(t)], h = {n, e} (9)
where λN0 is the baseline hazard, t is the length of employment and earningsi(t) is the individual's base
wage, i.e., base wage divided by the number of hours worked during the month.10 Xi(t) is a set of
explanatory variables which includes gender, age, education dummies and year dummies.
While we assume that the data-generating process of our observations is a continuous time one, we
acknowledge that the survival time data in our set are grouped - exact survival times are unknown and
we only observe the time interval (the year) within which they fall - which leads to the existence of
tied durations. Under this scenario, the exact likelihood function becomes quite complicated and both
exact and approximate estimation procedures increase computational time considerably. It is possible,11
nevertheless, to estimate the ϕh and βh parameters from a discrete time representation of the model: the
complementary log-log model; Appendix 1 shows how to go from a continuous-time PH model to this
specication. Having said that, our particular models for separations to employment and non-employment
are the following:
λh(ak, x) = 1− exp[−exp(βhln(earningsi(ak)) + ϕhXi(ak) + τhk )], h = {n, e} (10)
where λh(ak, x) is the discrete-time hazard function at time ak, the end of the period of time started at
ak−1, and the τk describe the pattern of duration dependence. Regarding these parameters, one will test
9Equivalently, one could estimate a Competing Risks Model, with employment at another rm and non-employment as
the two possible exit routes from a given employment spell.
10Total hourly earnings are used in a specication test provided below.
11And recommendable, given that the number of failures at each period is far from being of negligible size relative the
number of individuals at risk: the economy-wide average separation rate ranges from 14% to 23%.
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two dierent specications in the Aveiro dataset: a constant baseline hazard, which sets τk = 0 for all k,
and a nonparametric estimation of the baseline hazard, which sets τk as job spell duration-specic dummy
variables.12 It should be highlighted that ϕh and βhare the same parameters as those of the continuous
time model.
In both models, the coecient on log earnings is an estimate of the corresponding separation elasticity.
During estimation, the entire sample will be used, with workers who remain with the same employer at
the end of the data set being considered to have a censored employment spell, as well as job movers for
the model in which h = n and those who separate to non-employment when h = e. This contrasts with
all previous literature, which proceeded like in this study in the model for separations to non-employment
but restricted the sample in the model for separations to employment to workers who do not separate
to non-employment. While both approaches are valid, one takes a surprisingly original step by behaving
coherently in both models.
As for the third quantity, the wage elasticity of the share of recruits from employment, it is estimated
through a logit model for the probability that a given new worker was recruited from employment
PR,emp =
exp(βθ ln(earningsit) + ϕ
θXit)
1 + exp(βθ ln(earningsit) + ϕθXit)
(11)
where PR,emp = 1 if a recruit comes from employment and Xi contains the same explanatory variables
as in the separations models. Regarding our coecient of interest, one has that εRθw = β
θ ∗ [1 − θR(wt)],
with the second factor coming as an observation-weighted time average of the year-rm gures, due to
the time-invariant specication imposed upon εRθw(by turn, for consistency with the other two estimated
elasticities) and because years with more observations contribute more to the estimation procedure.
After estimating the three models above, one just needs to compute θR(wt), θs(wt), s
e(wt), s
n(wt) and
γt to obtain rm-level estimates of the labor supply elasticity according to equation (8). By using time-
invariant coecients on log hourly real earnings in the computation of the elasticity of the labor supply
over the short-run, one implicitly assumes that se(wt), s
n(wt) and θR(wt) have iso-elastic specications




sw. This is the price to pay for not
introducing additional noise in the elasticity estimates, which would come as a consequence of replacing
a single regressor with Tj interaction terms, where Tj is the number of sample periods during which one
observes rm j.
12While the pattern of duration dependence in the underlying hazard function cannot be described without imposing
restrictions on the specication of the τhk , these will represent the change in the log of the integrated hazard function from
the end of one interval to the other - i.e., the regression coecients will be estimated in a semi-parametric fashion, in an
almost analogous way to the estimation of a Cox PH model in continuous time.
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The results from estimating several specications of (10) and (11) for the Aveiro dataset are presented







Wage only -.4322 -.6563 .5553 .5394 1.2018
No year eects -.5509 -.8436 .7612 .6316 1.3363
Full model -.7016 -.7218 .9001 .5705 .5217
Full model, total earnings -.3910 -.5030 .6969 .2155 .4443
Nonparametric baseline hazard
Wage only -.0023 -.4388 .5553 -.2044 -.4426
No year eects -.1914 -.5606 .7612 -.0712 -.6643
Full model -.2789 -.4401 .9001 -.3592 -.1020
Full model, total earnings -.0588 -.2608 .6969 -.3708 -.2152
Estimates for the Aveiro dataset. The 2.5% largest and smallest estimates of εNw were removed from the sample. Firm-level
averages are presented in the rst four columns, time-average values from full-sample estimation presented in the fth column.
Table 1: Firm-level average of estimated elasticities of the labor supply.
The results displayed in Table 1 present a sizable dierence between the models assuming a constant
baseline hazard and those which rely on nonparametric estimation of this component of the hazard function
(and which show that separations to both employment and non-employment display negative duration
dependence). The eect of allowing for duration dependence on the estimated elasticities is in line with
what is predicted by Manning (2003, p.103): The inclusion of job tenure always drastically reduces the
estimated wage elasticity as high-tenure workers are less likely to leave the rm and are more likely to
have high wages; this is due to the fact that, for a higher wage, it is less likely that workers will get a
higher oer elsewhere and it is less likely for the reservation wage to rise above the wage. As we believe
that controlling for tenure will capture the eect of wages on the likelihood that workers will separate -
meaning, in the light of our theoretical framework, the likelihood that a worker gets a higher wage oer or
the likelihood that his/her reservation wage rises above its wage -, which is precisely the eect of interest,
we will use the estimates from the exponential model.
Moreover, and perhaps most importantly, it should be highlighted that our choice of a duration model
is driven by its functional match with Manning's (2003) exposition of the separation rates as instantaneous
(thus, exponential) rates, rather than by a belief that this is how the issue should be genuinely modeled.
What we want to obtain from the separation equations is the wage elasticity of the separation rate which,
by the time one considers controlling for tenure, becomes a dierent empirical question from the wage
elasticity of the (discrete) hazard function for a given worker. This means that, on sheer econometric
grounds, estimating the wage elasticity of the separation rate through any other binary model, such as a
logit or a probit model, would be equally valid. The advantage of using the complementary log-log model
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is that one can map our procedure directly to the specic empirical issue at stake - our coecients of
interest are the desired elasticities - and to the existing literature.
Regarding other specication issues, one may state a big contrast relative to Webber's (2013a) low
sensitivity to the inclusion of controls to the models. Both standard individual controls and year eects
(capturing the impact of the macroeconomic environment in the rm's separation rate) lead the coecients
on the wage to vary signicantly, both in the constant and in the nonparametric hazard specications.
Such sensitivity is also an issue when regarding the choice between using the base wage or total wage as the
independent variable of interest in the three models. One can argue in favor of each of these variables: on
the one hand, insofar as total wages include variable payments, which appear in our database as absolute
payments, using them as the wage variable will introduce some wage variation to which the worker will
never react (that which is due to volatility in worker performance) and will, hence, underestimate the
labor supply elasticity; on the other hand, using the base wage as the wage variable will ignore worker
heterogeneity in terms of their compensation schema. We choose in favor of the one whose imperfections
have an ambiguous, rather than decisively downward-biasing, impact, which is also the most conservative
measure, i.e., that which leads to a higher estimate for the elasticity - the base wage.
Results
After obtaining our rm-level measures, we erased from the sample the top and bottom 1% of the estimates.
Moreover, we made the choice of excluding from the sample rms whose time-average of the estimates for
εNw came out negative. It is our understanding that the fact that we cannot distinguish quits from res
in our dataset can jeopardize our purposes of identifying the labor supply, in that it rather captures labor
demand determinants. Under the innocuous theoretical prediction that, everything else constant, workers
with a higher wage are more likely to be laid-o by employers (as it is more likely that a negative shock
drives match productivity below the wage, the main driver of job destruction in search models like those
of Mortensen and Pissarides, 1994), rms whose corresponding separations disguise a high share of quits
will present positive separation elasticities, which by turn will contribute to a smaller estimate for the
elasticity of the labor supply. Therefore, our decision aims at keeping only those rms whose separations
represent, with a good level of reliability, voluntary quits rather than dismissals.
Having said that, we proceed by presenting our estimates for εN in the following histogram, with
summary statistics presented in Table 2 below:
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Figure 1: Histogram of the estimated wage elasticities of the labor supply facing the rm.
1% 5% 10% 25% 50% 75% 90% 95% Mean Full
εN 0.018 0.085 0.161 0.415 0.977 2.130 4.269 6.446 1.804 1.502
Figures for the observation-weighted distribution of estimated elasticities. Time-average gure for the full model.
Firm-level estimates: 6,017,923 observations | Full economy model: 43,209,364 observations
Table 2: Distributional statistics for the estimated wage elasticities of the labor supply facing the rm.
This said, one should note that the rm-level average gure of 1.804 - as well as the full economy gure,
1.502 - reveals that rms possess a large degree of monopsony power in the Portuguese labor market.
These estimates should be compared to those of Webber (2013a) and Hirsch et al. (2013), which deploy
the same empirical methodology to countrywide matched employer-employee data sets. We nd that our
full economy estimate is much lower than Hirsch et al.'s (2013) 2.04413 and higher than Webber's (2013a)
0.76, while the average value for the rm-level estimates also ranks above that of the latter paper, 1.08.
Comparisons with this study are, however, deemed to be inconclusive, as the author's empirical approach
to the estimation of the separation elasticities (Cox Proportional Hazards model) controls for tenure,
which the eects highlighted above. One can only state that workers in Portugal are, on average, less
mobile than their German counterparts, something that ts well in the common understanding one has of
contemporary labor markets in advanced economies (Elsby et al., 2013), and that our rm-level estimates
are, as Webber's, concentrated in very low values, with values close to zero as the mode. Perhaps most
importantly, another crucial dierence between this work and our two main references is that our data
are annual (rather than quarterly), which attenuates the observable frequency of job and worker ows and
also biases our results downward in the presence of unobserved worker heterogeneity, in light of what is
13Average value of the time-varying estimates, where the three elasticities are themselves time-varying as the wage was
interacted with the lagged unemployment rate.
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shown in Manning (2003, p.110).
One can further make use of our rm-level estimates to see how they vary along sectors. One obtains
this by running a regression of the estimates on a set of REV2 sector dummies with no constant to obtain
the average value of the rm-level estimates per sector. In Table 3 below, one can see that more unionized
sectors appear to be the ones with the most elastic labor supply (Transportation and Communication,
Public Enterprises or Financial Services), while sectors such as Retail or Chemical Products are where one


















Table 3: Regional average of the wage elasticities of the labor supply facing the rm.
Now that we have analyzed our results from the rm-level estimation exercise, we will submit our
results to a specication test by the form of estimating the impact of rm demand market power on
workers' wages.
6 Monopsony and wages
Having produced rm-level estimates of the elasticity of labor supply, one can use such estimates to study
their impact on wages, following Webber (2013a), and to assess the extend to which xed eects arising
from a wage equation reect such market power. This second level of analysis is a novelty in the literature
and may reveal to what extend dierent dimensions of unobserved time-invariant heterogeneity correlate
with the estimated quantities.
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The general model to be estimated in this section is the following:
ln(earningsijt) = ψεjt + ςt + δZit + µFjt + uit (12)
where εjt stands for the estimated labor supply elasticities, ςt are time eects, Zit is a set of individual
controls including tenure and tenure squared, age and age squared, gender and education dummies, Fjt
is a set of rm-level controls comprised of log real sales per worker, industry and region dummies and log
rm size and - nally - uit is the standard error term.
The exercise of market power
In this subsection, interest lies solely upon ψ, the impact of rm market power on wages, and on the coe-
cient on log size, commonly known as the Employer Size Wage Eect (ESWE). Table 4 presents estimates
of the two coecients for various specications. All models present in this table feature only year xed
eects, which are suitable to be estimated through the introduction of dummy variables, as the estimated
components of εNw are time-invariant and, hence, the introduction of rm or worker xed eects would
capture their impact on wages and would render the elasticity of labor supply statistically insignicant for
wage determination. Whenever the estimated elasticities are used in estimation, bootstrapped standard
errors are computed to account for measurement error in εjt for evaluating the precision of ψ̂.
No tenure No logsize No market power Full Model
εjt -.0032* -.0040* -.0039*
(.000060) (.000064) (.001357)
ln(Nj) .0121* .0098** .0013*
(.000489) (.004544) (.005723)
Observations 6,014,491 5,984,026 11,041,801 5,984,026
Standard-errors in parenthesis; Bootstrapping is used whenever εjt is included; *p<0.01; **p<0.05; ***p<0,1.
Table 4: The impact of market power on wages
Looking at the presented results, the main conclusion is that, regardless of the specication, the impact
of the elasticity of the labor supply on earnings is of negligible size - at its largest estimate, an increase of
one unit in the elasticity of the labor supply to the rm will lead to a decrease in the wage of approximately
.4%. Although economically insignicant in its size, that the coecient is statistically dierent from zero
on the negative, rather than on the positive size, casts doubt on the validity of our estimates as measuring
monopsony power. As explained in Webber (2013b), a negative coecient estimate reects an eciency-
wage perspective of the labor market according to which rms would pay workers higher wages to reduce
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turnover. In such a case, the causality relationship is inverted: rms pay wages above market-clearing
levels in order to have lower turnover and to make workers less sensitive to further wage changes. Being it
as it may, this estimate comes at a stark contrast to that same study's estimates, which range from 0.13
to 0.15.
Another interesting conclusion one can draw from these results concerns the way the Employer Size-
Wage Eect coexists with the estimated elasticities in this wage regression. Although both coecients are
reduced in size when the other is introduced in the equation, both remain statistically signicant at the
most solid level. This may point out to a labor supply whose components are not iso-elastic or to the fact
that the ESWE contains factors other than an upward slopping labor supply curve, such as rent-sharing,
compensating wage dierentials or unobserved labor quality14. Taking Manning's (2003) exposition in
consideration, the ESWE may also contain factors aecting labor demand, such as economies of scale or
the correlation between labor demand and supply shocks. What seems to be certain is that other factors
are relevant in explaining the positive correlation between wages and rm size and that their eect upon
wages is much more important in wage determination.
Monopsony and Unobserved Heterogeneity
In this subsection, our main goal is to assess to what extend do the labor supply elasticity estimates are
correlated with the standard xed eects found in wage equations. To this end, we estimate a Mincer
equation with no measure of labor market power so as to recover standard xed eects, against which our
measures of market power will be compared.
The model we will estimate is a wage equation with three high-dimensional xed eects: worker xed
eects (ωi), rm xed eects (ηj) and job-match xed eects (ρs), relying on the identication procedure
proposed by Guimarães and Portugal (2010), an iterative procedure yielding exact OLS estimation of the
high-dimensional xed eects.
Specifying an index s for the occupational type of the worker, the model is specied as follows. All the
control variables remain in such equations (except, of course, those whose identication is made impossible
by the inclusion of xed eects).
ln(earningsijt) = ωi + ηj + ρs + ςt + δZits + µFjt + uit (13)
14Manning (2003) lists these three factors as possible alternative explanations to the ESWE, stating, respectively, that
more productive rms tend to be larger, that larger rms may have worse working conditions or that larger rms have more
productive matches.
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After estimating the model and recovering the estimates for the three xed eects, one will assess
the correlation between the estimated elasticities and the three layers of unobserved heterogeneity we
specify: worker time-invariant characteristics which impact the wage it earns, commonly taken as its
ability (unobserved to the analyst but perceived by the employer); rm eects capturing its wage policy
and other permanent aspects, such as wage-enhancing technology; job title eect, with job title being the
combination of the professional category of the worker with the collective agreement covering his contract,
and which reects the distinct tasks performed by workers that dene the set of occupational boundaries
(Torres et al. 2013).
The results of running an OLS regression of the estimates for the rm-level elasticities on the three
xed eects (plus a set of industry , regional and year controls) are presented in Table 5. Bootstrapped
standard-errors are used so as to account for measurement error in the xed eects.








Bootstrapped s.e. in parenthesis. *p<0.01; **p<0.05; ***p<0,1.
Table 5: OLS regression output of εNw on rm, worker and job title FE.
The estimates presented in Table 5 point towards the direction of eciency wages suggested in the
last subsection. In both specications, it is seen that rms with a more generous wage policy face a
less elastic labor supply and that job titles which pay more than average can be found in those same
rms. It is important to mention that the job title xed eect is a mix of two eects: the bargaining
power of the agents who set minimum wages while discussing each collective agreement and the eect of
promotions from one professional category to another. Should this second eect be the most prevalent, one
can interpret the correlation between this xed eect and the the estimated elasticities as extra evidence
of the eciency wage perspective, in that workers experience higher tenure because they are paid more
and that leads to promotions within the rm. By contrast with these two conclusions, it seems that more
able workers are allocated to rms which face more elastic labor supplies, which may indicate that such
workers face less mobility costs and therefore contribute to higher estimates of εNw. Insofar as worker
xed eect is the best proxy one can obtain for worker (and, thus, job match) productivity, this result is
also evidence against the theoretical model of Postel-Vinay and Robin (2002), which predicts that most
productive workers, who will match the most productive rms, would be allocated to the rms with largest
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wage-setting power. Finally, one should observe that none of the regressors varies with time, by contrast
with the regressand, thus the coecient estimates will reect the correlation between the xed eects and
some observation-weighted time average of the rm-level elasticities.15
7 Conclusion
In this study, we built on the dynamic monopsony literature so as to estimate the degree of worker mobility
characterizing the Portuguese labor market by deploying, for the rst time, a discrete time specication.
After providing evidence on the dierences between imposing no duration dependence and introducing
tenure non-parametrically in estimating the two separation elasticities, we concluded that employers face
very rigid labor supply curves, translating into a high degree of wage-setting power.
Following this exercise, however, we found evidence against the monopsonistic view of the labor market,
namely in its prediction of the correlation between the elasticity of the labor supply and wages: we found
evidence of a tiny but signicant negative correlation between the two variables. While one can argue that
it does not mean much to achieve statistical signicance with 6 to 11 million observations, the fact is that
the data rejected a decisively positive impact of the wage elasticity of the labor supply facing the rm on
wages. Moreover, estimating worker, rm and job title xed eects and analyzing the allocation of such
eects along the estimated elasticities reinforced the suggestion of the estimation of the wage equation
towards an eciency wage explanation of the labor market: rms pay workers higher wages to keep them
from separating, leading to a negative correlation between the rm's wage policy and the elasticity of the
labor supply it faces. Evidence from this is found in our exercise.
In this sense, one may say that while this nding is of utmost importance for the understanding of the
functioning of our labor markets, it serves positive economics much better than normative economics.This
would be the case even if we would nd evidence in favor of the exercise of market power by employers:
given what is discussed in Manning (2003), the simple recipe of imposing the right minimum wage upon
an isolated monopsonist does not extend to more realistic models of labor markets with frictions. For
instance, according to the problem one wants to study in an extended Burdett and Mortensen model, one
can have that the free market has too much or too little employment, and there can even be no theoretically
optimal minimum wage a policy-maker can set; one just has to introduce simultaneously heterogeneity in
the reservation wage of workers and entry (with costs) by rms to have a welfare function with ambiguous
15In fact, we also estimated the model using the time average of εNw as the dependent variable, obtaining qualitatively
similar results.
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dependence upon employment - in a market equilibrium with too many rms paying entry costs, workers
may be beneted due to the increased wage. Alternatively, introducing human capital investment by
workers and rms will generate multiple equilibria. If one adds to this our conclusion regarding the (lack
of) exercise of market power by rms upon wages, claiming for labor market intervention on the grounds
of the existence of considerable monopsony power becomes an unsurpassable task.
Despite the fact that we were not able to prove monopsony, its main premise is common with what we
nd: workers are not innitely mobile across rms, which enables rms to have some discretion over the
wage they pay. Going back to the initial words of this study, the answer to the question What happens
if the employer raises the wage it pays its workers by one cent? is not It would meet an innite supply
of labor. In that the importance of a labor market with frictions as described by the monopsonistic view
does not depend on the existence of a downward pressure, by the employer, on its workers wages, our
results do not pinch the potential gains of taking a monopsonistic view to labor markets. In essence, what
hinders behind our nal conclusions is the same that would be present should we reach conclusions in
line with those in Webber (2013a): that workers are not perfectly mobile across potential employers. One
should not forget that the lack of worker mobility is precisely what we rst expect to - and do - estimate.
All in all, this study has taken a couple of steps further in understanding the nature and sources of
demand market power in contemporary labor markets. In our understanding, further research is needed in
improving the estimates for the labor supply elasticities, namely by adopting a new theoretical framework
based on Burdett and Mortensen (1998) but which may handle at least one of the caveats of the incumbent
model. One of such aws concerns the specication of the dynamic labor supply in equation (1); Falch
(2013) points out to the fact that this is, in fact, an employment identity which ignores all workers which
would like to work for the rm at the given wage but are unable to do so because employment is demand
constrained. For rms at which this is the prevailing case, our specication of the labor supply is actually
right censored at the employment level, which will lead to an underestimate of the labor supply elasticity.
A second caveat concerns the inclusion of instruments other than the wage that the rm may use to
impact the labor supply it faces. Manning (2006), in his Generalized Model of Monopsony, presents the
concept of the labor cost fuction (non-wage per-worker costs of maintaining employment at a given level,
such as hiring eort) to reach the eective labor supply elasticity including such factors. This may be the
solution for the fact that mandated wage rises and mandated employment increases have both produced
small changes in the other endogenous variable across the empirical literature (Manning, 2011). A third
problem of our model is the assumption of the Burdett and Mortensen (1998) model that a worker will
leave his/her rm for the tiniest wage gain, although this is not considered to be neither crucial nor of
19
straightforward solution, at least in a way that would bring much improvements upon the current state
of things. The rst two avenues appear as the most promising in providing estimation of labor supply
elasticities of the highest quality and, hence, in answering to the big question mark our results, when
compared with those of Webber (2013a), have left about demand market power in the labor market.
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Appendix 1: The complementary log-log model
Following Jenkins (2004), synthesizing the combination of covariates and parameters as x and suppressing, for
now, the superscript h, the survivor function at time ak, the end of the interval (ak−1, ak], is given by
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which, setting φ(x) = exp(x), yields
S(ak, x) = exp[−exp(x)
akˆ
0
λ0(u)du] = exp[−Hkexp(x)] (15)
with −Hk ≡ H(ak) =
´ ak
0
λ0(u)du being the integrated baseline hazard at the end of the given interval. Looking
now at the discrete hazard rate λ(ak, x) ≡ λk(x):
λk(x) =




= 1− exp[exp(x)(Hk−1 −Hk)] (16)
Finally, applying a ln(−ln(.)) transformation leads to the complementary log-log model
ln[1− λk(x)] = exp(x)(Hk−1 −Hk)
⇐⇒ ln(−ln[1− λk(x)]) = x+ ln(Hk −Hk−1) = x+ τk (17)
By estimating a cloglog model, one is able to estimate, from grouped data, the parameters contained in x of the
underlying continuous time model, plus the parameters τk representing the dierences in values of the integrated
baseline hazard from the start to the end of the time interval. As stated in the text, while theτk cannot describe the
exact pattern of duration dependence in the underlying model unless they are assumed to have a given functional
form - rather, they identify the pattern of duration dependence in the interval hazard function -, there are cases,
like ours, when such pattern is not the object of the study and when interest lies solely upon the estimation of the
regression coecients.
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